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Britain’s future role in Europe and the world is one of the key disagreements in the Brexit debate: whether
it’ll surge or decline is the question?  Mareike Kleine focuses on an aspect that has so far received
less attention in the debate, namely the relationship between domestic politics and Britain’s role in
world affairs, and concludes that a Brexit will likely condemn the UK to parochialism.
Most proponents of the Britain’s exit from the EU allege that it would strengthen rather than weaken
the UK’s role in world affairs. Most foreign policy and trade pundits disagree with this claim, citing
the damaging uncertainty in the aftermath of an “Out”-vote and the UK’s diminished bargaining
power in future trade negotiations.
In this post, I will focus on an aspect that has so far received less attention in the debate, namely the relationship
between domestic politics and Britain’s role in world affairs. To exaggerate only slightly, because of this relationship,
Brexit will likely condemn the UK to parochialism.
Leave campaigners base their argument on the assumption that, without the EU, the UK will be free to pursue its
enlightened, rational foreign policy, as it did in the past. I believe that this is a very questionable assumption that is
based on a biased reading of British history, overconfidence in a supposed British foreign policy culture and, most
importantly, an ignorance of the UK’s changed political landscape.
London Bridge
First, and most apparent, the public has lost interest in global engagement, certainly engagement by military means.
Second, we know from the political economy literature that majoritarian electoral systems, as in the UK, tend to be
more responsive to protectionist pressures, ceteris paribus, than systems of proportional representation, as they
exist on the continent. My colleague Stephanie Rickard found that this holds true not only for tariffs, but also for non-
tariff barriers and subsidies.
European Union law against non-discrimination and the EU’s very successful and highly effective competition policy
prevent government from national protectionist reflexes, as demonstrated in aftermath of the financial crisis when
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Europe was spared the protectionist backlash that many feared.
How will British governments fight off protectionist forces and damaging beggar-thy-neighbor impulses without the
disciplining power of EU law and the EU’s competition policy? It is quite possible that these interests would hijack
the post-Brexit renegotiations with the EU as well as the renegotiations of the many Preferential Trade Agreements
that the UK will drop out of in the event of Brexit. Great Britain is likely going to end up more cut off global markets
than ever before.
Third, there is substantial evidence that governments with unstable domestic coalitions become more equivocal and
hesitant to commit. Although it looks like the Conservative party will stay in power for a long time to come, it will still
have to tip toe on eggshells in order not to upset the many cross-cutting frictions within the UK. Just to mention a
few:
The Conservative party itself will continue to fight over the UK’s specific relationship to the EU, as
demonstrated by the frictions within the cabinet over Brexit.
UKIP is not going to go away after Brexit. The potentially arduous renegotiations with the EU will offer plenty
of opportunities for UKIP to mobilize and exploit frictions within the Conservative party.
These fights will put a strain on England’s relationship with the more pro-European Scotland and the deeply
divided Northern Ireland.
Any trade negotiation with the EU and third countries will lay bare the massive imbalances between London
and the rest of the UK.
These unstable and volatile domestic interests will make any ruling government very hesitant to pursue a clear and
stable foreign policy. This ambiguity will in turn make the UK a very unattractive because a potentially unreliable
cooperating partner, to the EU and to the rest of the world, no matter how special the relationship .
In short: Think not Norway, Switzerland or Singapore. Think Liechtenstein, and you will get a picture of Britain’s
future status in world affairs.
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